Consider a race between 2 candidates. Whoever spends the most money in their campaign wins the election and gets a utility v = 3 (v more than equal…

3. Consider a race between 2 candidates. Whoever spends the most money in theircampaign wins the election and gets a utility v >= 3 (v more than equal to 3). They also value campaignfunding in terms of dollars spent. Therefore, after spending ci on a campaign, ifcandidate i is elected, her utility is v-ci, and otherwise, it is simply be -ci. Ties arebroken by a supreme court that is unpredictable and selects either candidate withprobability 1/2. Both candidates are rich and have budgets B > v, and spend inwhole dollars so that ci (0,1,….,v). The candidates simultaneously select ci.a. Are there any pure-strategy Nash equilibria? If so, list them. If not, explainwhy not.b. Suppose that v = 3, nd one mixed strategy equilibrium where each playerrandomizes among (0,1,2). (Try to write down the normal form game.)